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Mergers and acquisitions are a fast way for a ﬁrm to acquire assets. Using plant-level
data, we examine how ﬁrms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions. We ﬁnd that
there is a surprisingly substantial amount of restructuring in a short period after mergers
are consummated. Acquirers sell 27% and close 19% of acquired plants within three years
after completing an acquisition. Plants that belong to the target’s peripheral divisions,
especially in industries in which asset values are increasing and in industries in which
the acquirer does not have a comparative advantage, are more likely to be sold by the
purchasing ﬁrm. Acquirers who exhibit skill in running their peripheral businesses tend
to retain acquired plants. Plants retained by acquirers increase in productivity whereas
sold plants do not. The extent of post-merger restructuring activities and their cross-
sectional variation do not support an empire building explanation for mergers. Acquirers
readjust their ﬁrm boundaries in ways that are consistent with the exploitation of their
comparative advantage across industries.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Mergers and acquisitions are a fast way for a ﬁrm to grow.1 Through mergers ﬁrms frequently acquire
portfolios of assets spanning several industries. After the merger, the acquiring ﬁrm faces decisions on how
to redraw its boundaries by keeping some newly acquired assets and selling others oﬀ. A tt h eo n ee n do f
the spectrum, the acquiring ﬁrm may match the assets it decides to keep to its talents, keeping only assets
which it can operate eﬃciently and sell oﬀ or close the remaining assets. At the other extreme, in mergers
motivated by pure empire building, the acquirer may decide to expand the ﬁrm and retain all its newly
acquired assets. Although how the ﬁrm redraws its boundaries may aﬀect the long run productivity of the
retained assets and their value, little is known about the extent and outcomes of post-merger restructuring.
In this paper, we analyze whether ﬁr m sr e t a i n ,c l o s e ,o rs e l lo ﬀ the acquired assets and characterize
the productive eﬃciency of retained and sold oﬀ assets. We show that acquiring ﬁrms engage in signiﬁcant
restructuring of the target’s assets in a short period following a merger. We examine two related questions
about how they restructure: First, are acquirers more likely to sell certain assets than others? Second, are
decisions to retain assets consistent with acquirers’ exploiting their comparative advantage? To address
these questions, we examine the plant retention, closure, and sales decisions in a relatively short time
period of three years after merger completion. Our study extends our knowledge of ﬁrm restructuring
beyond the longer term ﬁrm divestitures after merger that are examined by Kaplan and Weisbach (1992)
and Porter (1987).
We study 1,483 mergers completed between 1981 and 2000 in which the target ﬁrm operated at least
one plant in manufacturing (SIC codes 2000-3999). We use data from the Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD), maintained by the Center for Economic Studies at the Bureau of the Census. The LRD database
contains plant-level data for manufacturing plants. The plant-level coverage means that we can plant
performance even as they change owners or are closed down. These features are key to our study as they
allow us to look inside each acquisition and to identify individual plants that have changed hand subsequent
to the merger from year-to-year. We also benchmark each plant’s performance against comparable industry
plants and examine how plant operating margins and productivity change in the post-merger period for
1There is a large literature on mergers. See Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001)) for a survey, and Eckbo and Thornburn
(2007) for a more recent perspective.
1both kept and sold plants. We are thus able to test whether ﬁrms adjust their boundaries given their
comparative advantages.
We ﬁnd that in mergers, the acquisition of the target’s assets is merely the ﬁrst step in the process of
redeﬁning ﬁrm boundaries. In the typical merger, an acquirer does not passively absorb all the target plants
obtained in the merger. Instead, a merger is followed by a period of vigorous restructuring of target assets
that signiﬁcantly impacts the boundaries of the acquiring ﬁrm. Within three years after the completion
of an acquisition, 27% of plants are sold and 19% are closed down, leaving the acquirer with about half
the plants that are initially obtained in an acquisition. These proportions are broadly stationary over time
and are higher for larger acquisitions.
The readjustment of ﬁrm boundaries after acquisitions varies cross-sectionally in ways that are con-
sistent with the exploitation of their comparative advantage across industries. We ﬁnd that acquirers are
more likely to retain plants of ﬁrms they purchase if they already operate a plant in the same industry
and acquirers are particularly likely to retain purchased plants that are add to their largest divisions.
Plants in the target’s peripheral divisions, which are less likely to be the object of the acquisition, are
signiﬁcantly more likely to be sold than plants in the target’s main divisions. These ﬁndings support the
general proposition that many purchasers buy whole ﬁrms when they are ex ante interested in a subset of
the target ﬁrm’s assets, in particular its main division.
Furthermore acquirers are more likely to retain plants based on whether the acquirer has high skill.
We ﬁnd that acquirers are less likely to retain plants if the productivity of their existing plants in their
own peripheral segments is low. Low productivity of existing peripheral segments/ plants indicates that a
ﬁrm likely to already be beyond its optimal size. These eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant. The marginal
eﬀect of acquirer skill on the probability of keeping a target plant is 17 to 19%. Moreover, in industries
that have experienced a positive shock in the preceding two years this eﬀect doubles to 39%.
We also ﬁnd that the probability of sale of acquired plants depends on market prices. Sales are more
likely to occur in industries which have experienced a stock price run-up, in the case of target’s peripheral
divisions. Conglomerate acquirers are more likely to sell target’s plants in a segment following a run-
up if they themselves are not eﬃcient producers in that segment. Examining ex post productivity and
operating margins changes, we ﬁnd that while retained plants increase in productivity after the merger, the
productivity of plants that are subsequently sold is unchanged. We also ﬁnd that performance improves
in target plants when acquiring ﬁrms have higher skill. Overall, ﬁr m ss h i f to u to fs e g m e n t si nw h i c ht h e y
do not have a comparative advantage and particularly so in response to a positive industry shock. These
2ﬁndings are consistent with ﬁrms adjusting their ﬁrm boundaries in response to both their skill and also
the relative opportunities they face for the assets they purchase. The evidence supports the neoclassical
model of conglomerate growth of Maksimovic and Phillips (MP) (2002),2 but is inconsistent with empire
building motivated mergers in which acquisitions reﬂect a pure taste for ﬁrm size.
Evidence from event studies suggests that the acquisition announcement eﬀects depend on whether
the acquisition is for stock or for cash. A possible explanation for this is that acquirers who pay with
stock might be using overpriced equity. Such acquirer’s might have an incentive to make acquisitions and
operate plants in ways that do not create wealth. In particular, such ﬁrms may not sell newly acquired
plants if doing so signals to the market that they do not have a comparative advantage in operating such
plants. However, the use of stock in acquisitions is statistically insigniﬁcant and economically negligible
in predicting restructuring and post-merger plant level productivity, and remains so when we instrument
for stock acquisitions. Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that the method of payment materially eﬀects the
disposition of acquired assets, suggesting that the price reaction discovered in event studies are likely a
result of information revelation about current market values and is not predictive of future uneconomic
decisions. We also ﬁnd no evidence that the operating performance of acquired plants is higher when the
parties to the merger have similar market-to-book ratios.
In sum, our evidence suggests that at the operational level the deployment and disposal of assets by
acquirers is broadly consistent with neoclassical theories of the scope of ﬁrms. When acquirers have a
comparative advantage in exploiting assets, they keep them. They sell assets that they do not have a
comparative advantage in or that are peripheral to their operations, especially when the market price of
such assets is high. Conglomerate acquirers are more likely to sell assets in their peripheral divisions that
they do not operate eﬃciently. We emphasize that our results do not rule out the possibility that acquirers
waste resources by overpaying for acquisitions. However, there is little evidence they mismanage the assets
that they acquire.
Previous studies of divestitures after mergers include Porter (1987), who argues that many mergers
are eventually divested in the long-term, and interprets this ﬁnding as evidence that many mergers are
misconceived. In a careful study, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) refute Porter’s view. Kaplan and Weisbach
examine divestitures of targets over relatively long time periods of up to 17 years after a merger. They
ﬁnd that 44% of their sample of mergers occurring in the years 1971-1982 had been wholly divested by
2MP extend Lucas (1978) to multiple industries and study the changes in ﬁrm scope and growth in response to demand
and other value shocks the ﬁrm receives in each of the industries in which the ﬁrm operates.
31989. Using ﬁrm write-oﬀ accounting data, up to half of divested the mergers were deemed successful.
Our work diﬀers from these two papers. We study the restructuring that occurs in a relatively short
time period of 3 years after a merger is consummated. We are not restricted to examining the timing
of total divestitures because our dataset is at the level of the individual plant. Thus, we are able to
track individually all acquired plants, including plants absorbed by the acquirer’s existing divisions, plants
sold between acquisition and ﬁnal divestitures of the acquired assets. The disaggregate view of targets at
the level of plants also enables us to test predictions of theories of the ﬁrm about both the disposal and
post-acquisition proﬁtability of the acquired plants.
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use Line of Business data to examine the 1975-1977 performance of
segments acquired in 65 tender oﬀers. Because the Line of Business data is only available in the narrow
1975-1977 time window, it is not feasible for them to compare the performance of individual business lines
of the merged ﬁrm with the pre-merger performance of the same units. Thus, Ravenscraft and Scherer are
f o r c e dt oc o m p a r eL i n eo fB u s i n e s sd a t aa f t e rt h em e r g e rw i t ht h ew h o l et a r g e tﬁrm pre-merger, which in
their sample may operate several such lines. Furthermore, the tender oﬀers in their sample occur a median
7 years before the start of the window. Thus, for most oﬀers they do not observe dispositions in the years
immediately following the tender oﬀer. Finally, their dataset cannot isolate acquired assets as their data
commingles the asset acquired in the tender oﬀers with the acquirer’s own assets. Given these limitations,
they argue that the data “compels an agnostic inference that takeovers neither degraded nor improved
the basic operating performance of target ﬁrms.(p. 153).” In a subsequent paper, Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1992) analyze whether sales of ﬁrms’ lines of business are higher for post merger divestitures in the period
1977-81. However, the indicators of merger activity they use do not address post merger disposition of
acquired assets directly. Thus, for example, they examine whether lines of business created before 1950,
but which grow through (some) mergers, have the same total divestiture rates as similar lines that do not
grow through any mergers, or as lines of business created after 1950.
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) study sales of industry segments using COMPUSTAT seg-
ment data. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely to sell assets in periods of high industry liquidity. Maksi-
movic and Phillips (2001) and Schoar (2002) look at the productivity of acquired plants following acquisi-
tions. Maksimovic and Phillips and Schoar ﬁnd that acquired plants increase in productivity on average.
However, none of these papers explores the plant retention/sales/closure decisions, their cross-sectional
determinants or compares the productivity of the retained or sold plants after the merger.
In the next section, we present theoretical predictions coming from prior work on mergers and acqui-
4sitions. In Section 3 we describe our sample and the data and variables we use. Sections 4 and 5 estimate
models of the decision to retain, sell, or close plants. Section 6 examines the changes in productive eﬃciency
after mergers. Section 7 concludes.
2 Hypotheses Tested in Our Study
In our study, we exploit the fact that in most mergers the target ﬁrm consists of a collection of assets,
some of which are related to the buyer’s main operations and some of which may not be so related. Thus,
when a merger occurs the buyer obtains a collection of assets which have various degrees of ﬁt with his
core competence. Some of these assets are in the target’s main business segments, and some of them might
have been considerably removed from the target’s own main competence. The buyer has to decide how
to redraw the boundaries of his ﬁrm – which plants to keep and which to sell. By examining how this
decision is made we can test to what extent the two hypotheses, empire building and value maximization,
predict the disposal of assets following a merger.
The hypothesis that ﬁrms’ investment and acquisitions are driven by managerial desire to maximize
ﬁrm size have received a great deal of attention in the literature starting with Jensen (1988) and Hart and
Moore (1992). In the post-merger context, ineﬃcient investment observationally similar to empire building
might also occur if merger decisions are motivated by hubris, as in Roll (1977), so that the acquirer’s
managers’ incorrectly believe that they have the ability to operate the target’s assets more productively
than they can.3 If the ﬁrm’s actions are driven by empire building or hubris, then after a merger we would
expect the following hypotheses to hold:
H1: All or most of the acquired assets are retained after the merger.
H2: The retained assets do not increase in productivity.
An alternative view is based on a neoclassical theory of the ﬁrm, in which ﬁrms’ boundaries shift across
industries in response to shocks that alter their and their competitors’ comparative advantage (Maksimovic
and Phillips (2002), Lucas (1978)). Under this view, a ﬁrm’s organization and talent is likely to be better
suited for some industries than for others. The payoﬀs from using that talent depends on the demand level
in each industry and the level of competition. Industry shocks change these payoﬀs. At the margin, the
ﬁrm deploys its managerial assets in industries where it obtains the greatest. marginal payoﬀ.
3Overconﬁdence in the ability to operate plants is more likely to arise with respect to the target’s segments in which
acquirer does not have prior experience.
5In the neoclassical theory, ﬁrms alter their boundaries in response to newly revealed information about
their comparative advantage across industries. Following a merger, the ﬁrm retains plants in which it has
a comparative advantage and disposes of plants where it does not. A ﬁrm’s comparative advantage may
vary by industry, and may shift over time within an industry as shocks disproportionately advantage highly
productive and less productive producers, leading to plant sales between ﬁrms.4 These considerations yield
several predictions about the acquirer’s decisions to keep, sell, or close acquired plants which we formalize
as the following hypotheses:5
H1a: An acquirer is more likely to retain an asset if he can improve or maintain its productivity, and
sell or close an asset if he cannot.
This comparative advantage hypothesis also suggests a relation between the disposal of assets and the
target’s internal structure. As shown by MP, the ﬁrm is more likely to be an eﬃcient producer in its main
divisions than it its peripheral divisions. Moreover, the acquirer is more likely to do a whole ﬁrm takeover
when he wishes to retain the main division rather than a peripheral division. In the latter case, it would
be more eﬃcient for the ﬁrm to acquire the peripheral divisions only.6 Hence,
H1b: The assets that are sold are more likely to belong to the target’s peripheral divisions rather than
to its main divisions.
We also examine three additional predictions of the neoclassical model about post-merger disposal.
First, the model suggests that the boundary line between assets that are retained and assets that are sold
depends on the opportunity cost of retaining the assets. Thus,
H 3 :T h ea c q u i r e ri sm o r el i k e l yt os e l la na s s e tt h a th ec a n n o ti m p r o v ew h e nt h em a r k e tp r i c eo ft h o s e
assets is higher.
Second, the neoclassical model predicts that a ﬁrm expands until the marginal value of a plant equals
its opportunity cost under diﬀerent ownership. Thus, a ﬁrm whose marginal plants are eﬃcient is less
likely to have grown beyond its optimal size. When such a ﬁrm acquires additional assets in a merger, it
is less likely to sell such assets. Speciﬁcally,
4See Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) for details. Yang (2008) presents a dynamic model of trade in asssets as comparative
advantage shifts over time.
5Note that we are examining the evolution in the post-merger boundaries of the ﬁrm, not the original motivation for the
merger. The broader question of when it is optimal for an acquirer to buy a whole division and when it is optimal to buy a
segment is left for further research.
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6H4: An acquirer whose marginal plants are eﬃcient is less likely to sell plants acquired in a merger.
Note that hypothesis H4 pertains to the productivity of the acquirer’s marginal plants prior to the
merger. It makes no predictions about the relation between the average productivity of the acquirer’s
plants prior to the merger and the probability of a sale. Empirically, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002)
show that the plants in the peripheral divisions of a multi-industry ﬁrm are likely to be the ﬁrm’s marginal
plants. Plants in peripheral divisions have lower productivity and are more likely to be sold than plants
in main industries. With the identiﬁcation of eﬃciency of marginal plants as the eﬃciency of peripheral
plants, we can test H4. One additional complication is that perhaps the eﬃciency of peripheral plants is
related to the overall skill or eﬃciency of an acquirer. We can use data on the average operating margins
of acquiring ﬁrms to control for the possibility that the productivity of marginal plants is proxying for the
acquirer’s average productivity.
We also examine how eﬃcient and ineﬃcient producers in an industry react diﬀerently to a value
increasing shock that could, for example, be caused by a positive demand shock.7 As a result of a positive
industry shock, acquirers who are less eﬃcient in running marginal plants will ﬁnd it costlier to retain
their newly acquired plants because their expertise could be used elsewhere more proﬁtably. The higher
opportunity costs of retaining their newly acquired plants should make acquirers more likely to sell. By
contrast, acquirers who are more eﬃcient at the margin will face a lower incentive to sell. Speciﬁcally:
H5: Acquirers whose marginal plants are eﬃcient is less likely to sell a plant if the industry in which
the plant operates receives a positive value shock.
There has been a great deal of attention in the literature regarding the use of cash and/or stock for
acquisitions. Empirically, Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) show that the market reacts diﬀerently
to news of a stock or cash transaction. Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1988) and others argue that
the method of payment is a signal of the bidder’s value. If so, the method of payment may predict the
disposition and eﬃciency gains from the merger. Purchases for stock that occur because the acquiring ﬁrm
believes that its stock is overvalued by the market will not lead to productivity increases and are more
likely to be disposed oﬀ after the acquisition. This discussion suggests the following hypothesis.
H6: Assets acquired for cash are less likely to be sold or closed.
While many theories about gains from mergers posit the existence of synergies, the nature of the
synergies is not well understood. Existing evidence suggests that most eﬃciency gains occur when the
7See also the Appendix to Maksimovic and Phillips (2007).
7diﬀerence between the acquirer’s eﬃciency and that of the target is greatest (Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001), Schoar (2002)). A large eﬃciency diﬀerence increases the scope for the transfer of technology and
best practices across the business units of the new ﬁrm. More recently, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2006)
propose a model in which the greatest gains to a merger occur when the target and the acquirer have similar
productivities. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson test their model using stock market data, showing that the
greatest market gains from a merger occur between ﬁrms with similar book equity to market equity ratios.
However, this data does not disentangle the source of this gain, speciﬁcally whether it is directly related
to increased synergies or operating gains at the operating level or whether it arises from other causes such
as reduced administrative overheads. By using plant-level data, and distinguishing between kept and sold
plants, we can test whether synergies arise in the form of productivity gains for kept plants when acquirer’s
and target’s book equity to market equity ratios are similar. We therefore test the following:
H7: Eﬃciency gains of kept plants are higher in acquisitions in which the acquirer and target have
similar book equity to market equity ratios. No such relation exists for sold plants.
3D a t a
3.1 Sample
Our initial sample comes from the Securities Data Company (SDC) mergers and acquisitions database,
where we identify all mergers announced between 1981 and 2000, involved U.S. targets, had a completion
code equal to 1, and as in Schwert (1990), were completed within 180 days of announcement. To be a
potential candidate for our ﬁnal sample, we require that at least one of the target’s 4-digit SIC codes as
reported in SDC be in the manufacturing sector, i.e., have 4-digit SIC codes between 2000 and 3999. We
match the resulting sample with the Longitudinal Research database (LRD) maintained at the Census
Bureau. The LRD tracks approximately 50,000 manufacturing plants every year in the Annual Survey of
Manufactures (ASM). The ASM contains plant level information on output, employment, and expenditures
of all manufacturing plants that have at least 250 employees. All smaller plants are surveyed every ﬁfth
year. In addition, a random sample of smaller plants is selected every ﬁfth year to participate in a rotating
ﬁve-year panel. Once selected, plants are required by Federal. law to answer the survey questions. Many
data items used also represent items that are also reported to the IRS (e.g., the number of employees,
employee compensation, total value of shipments).
To track the acquired plants in the LRD, we require that the selected M&A deals have a match with
8the LRD. The sample period we study is based on data availability in the Census Bureau and SDC. The
start date is based on availability of reliable data on M&A transactions in the SDC database. The end
date of 2000 is dictated by the fact that we need three years after the completion date to track ownership
changes. When we conducted the analysis, the Census Bureau data were available only until 2004.
For every target that is matched to the LRD database, we record the owner of the plant in the reporting
year prior to the acquisition completion date. We track the plant ownership forward three years after the
acquisition completion year. For ownership change we rely on this identiﬁcation which was available for all
years except 1978 (for an unknown reason coverage codes did not identify ownership change in this year).
If the plant is shut down within the three year period, we record the year in which it was shut. If the
plant remains open, we trace its ownership. In some cases, we cannot track the plant disposition decision
reliably, because the output or the number of employees is below the Census reporting cutoﬀ in the next
ﬁve year sample. We discard these cases. They account for about 5% of the total plants transferred in
our sample. Given we calculate productivity and cash ﬂow changes as well as use lagged year data, we
also lose the initial year a ﬁrm or ﬁrm segment enters the database. We also lose observations that are
non-contiguous. Finally, we only include ﬁrms if their plants in an industry (at the three-digit SIC code)
have a total shipments value of at least $1 million in real 1982 dollars.
Table 1 shows the composition of our sample over time and how many of potential mergers we matched
to the LRD manufacturing database. In our ﬁnal sample of 2,309 acquisitions, the target has at least one
reported SIC code between 2000 and 3999 according to the SDC database and had matching target data
in COMPUSTAT. Of these 2,309 transactions, we could match 1,483 deals with targets with data in the
Longitudinal Research Database of the Annual Survey of Manufacturing maintained at the Department
of Commerce. The 1,483 M&A deals constitute our primary sample. Failures to match Compustat to
Department of Commerce data occur for several reasons. First, ﬁrms with smaller plants will not match
up to the database as plants of ﬁrms are only covered if the plants have more than 200 employees. Second,
we are using Compustat data that was matched by Department of Commerce staﬀ by name and address.
In many cases, names in the Commerce Department data represent divisions and not ultimate parents.
Insert Table 1 here
The time period from 1981 to 2000 covers two cycles in M&A transactions. The number of transactions
in our sample increase in the 1980s, peak in the late 1980s, then decline in the early 1990s, before picking
up again towards the end of our sample period. The dates of the peaks in M&A activity are related to the
9NBER business cycle dates. They are also consistent with the literature on merger waves (Andrade and
Staﬀord 2001, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Harford (2004)).
3.2 Variable Construction
i. Organizational Form and Related Acquisitions
To obtain a measure of organizational structure, we aggregate each ﬁrm’s plant-level data into ﬁrm
industry segments at the three-digit SIC codes. We call these industry ﬁrm-level portfolios of plants
“segments.” Segments, deﬁned this way, capture all the plant-level operations of a ﬁrm in an industry.8
We classify ﬁrms as single segment or multiple segment, based on the three-digit SIC code. We classify a
ﬁrm as a multi-segment ﬁrm if it produces more than 10 percent of its sales in a second SIC code outside
its principal three-digit SIC code. Using the 10 percent cut-oﬀ facilitates comparison with previous studies
as 10 percent is the cut-oﬀ that public ﬁrms report. For multiple-segment ﬁrms, we also classify each
segment as either a main segment or a peripheral segment. Main segments are segments whose value of
shipments is at least 25% of the ﬁrm’s total shipments. We classify a target ﬁrm’s plants as being related
to the acquiring ﬁrm if it has the same 3-digit SIC code as a main division of the acquirer. Thus, within
acquisitions some plants can be classiﬁed as related and others as unrelated.
ii. Target and Acquirer Book-to-Market ratios
We include the target’s book-to-market value of equity ratio in all regressions. This variable is con-
structed using the book value of equity from Compustat divided by the market value of equity in each
year. An analogous variable is calculated for the acquiring ﬁrm. We also calculate a measure of related
using market value measures. We construct a variable called “diagonal.” We ﬁrst compute the decile
of a ﬁrm’s book-to-market ratio using breakpoints obtained from Ken French’s website. We then deﬁne
diagonal to be equal to one if the target and acquirer book-to-market deciles are the same or have deciles
within one of each other, and zero otherwise.
8The segments we construct do not correspond to those reported by COMPUSTAT. However, segment data reported by
COMPUSTAT are subject to reporting biases. Firms have considerable ﬂexibility in how they report segments as shown by
Pacter (1993). Firms may also have strategic reasons for the speciﬁc segments they choose or choose not to report, as Hayes
and Lundholm (1996) shows. Hyland (1999) ﬁnds that only 72 percent of ﬁrms that report under the FASB standards that
they go from one segment to more than one segment actually increase their number of segments.
10iii. Plant-level Measures of Productive Eﬃciency
We calculate operating margins for each plant. The numerator of this margin is the value of shipments
less the value of labor costs and all input costs, such as materials and energy. We divide this numerator by
the value of shipments made by the plant. We industry adjust a plant’s operating margin in each year by
subtracting out the industry median operating margin. All dollar values for this calculation are deﬂated
to 1982 dollars using three-digit price with separate deﬂators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for
shipments, wage costs, materials, and energy. This operating margin diﬀers from a typical cash ﬂow
number because our plant-level data does not measure indirect segmental level costs, such as advertising
and research and development. Our measures focus on the operating or productive eﬃciency of plants.
A related measure of productive eﬃciency is the total factor productivity (TFP) of a plant. We compute
TFP to capture acquirer skill and also to examine post-merger performance. We use as our measure of
acquirer skill, the average TFP of a plants ﬁrm’s peripheral divisions (divisions with less than 10% of ﬁrm
output). TFP takes the actual amount of output a plant produces with a given amount of inputs and
compares it to a predicted amount of output. “Predicted output” is what the plant is expected to have
produced, given the amount of inputs it used. A plant that produces more than the predicted amount of
output has a greater-than-average productivity. This measure does not impose the restrictions of constant
returns to scale and constant elasticity of scale that a “dollar in, dollar out” cash ﬂow measure would
require.
To calculate a plant’s TFP and predicted output, we assume that the plants in each industry have
a translog production function. This functional form is a second-degree approximation to any arbitrary
production function, and therefore takes into account interactions between inputs. In estimating the
production function we use the last ﬁve years of data for each plant - thus the ﬁrst year of our data for
which we have calculated productivity is 1979. For each industry we estimate this production function
using an unbalanced panel with plant-level ﬁxed eﬀects. To estimate productivity, we take the translog
production function and run a regression of log of the total value of shipments on the log of inputs, including
cross-product and squared terms:
lnQit = A + fi +
N X
j=1
cj lnLjit +
N X
j=1
N X
k=j
cjklnLjitlnLkit, (1)
where Qit represents output of plant i in year t, and Ljit is the quantity of input j used in production for
plant i for time period t. A is a technology shift parameter, assumed to be constant by industry, fi is a
11plant-ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect (if a plant changes owners a new ﬁxed eﬀect is estimated. We leave oﬀ the
ﬁrm subscript for tractability), and cj =
PN
i=1 cji indexes returns-to-scale. We deﬂate for industry price
at the four digit level.
We obtain our measure of plant-level TFP from equation (1). This measure has two components that
we add together to get a measure of productivity. First we have a plant-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, fi, which we use
in the regression to predict segment ﬁnancial dependence. The ﬁxed eﬀect captures persistent productivity
eﬀects, such as those arising from managerial quality (Griliches (1957) and Mundlak (1961, 1978)). It also
captures a segment’s ability to price higher than the industry average. Second, we obtain a plant residual
in each year.
In each case we standardize plant-level TFP by subtracting out industry average TFP in each year and
dividing by the standard deviation of TFP for each industry. We standardize to control for diﬀerences in
precision with which productivity is estimated within industries. This correction is analogous to a simple
measurement error correction and is similar to the procedure used to produce standardized cumulative
excess returns in event studies.9
In constructing the abnormal changes in operating margins and TFP that we analyze later, we also
control for predictable time series variation in margins and TFP by removing the typical change that
occurs for plants. For instance, we estimate the typical change in TFP by regressing future levels in TFP
(and operating margins) on initial TFP (operating margins) for all plants. We obtain a coeﬃcient of mean
reversion for each year that we apply the initial levels of TFP (operating margins) for the plants of merging
ﬁrms in our sample.
In estimating the operating margins and TFPs in our sample, we use data for over 1,000,000 plant
years, and for approximately 50,000 plants each year. In the productivity regression for each industry, we
include three diﬀerent types of inputs, capital, labor, and materials, as explanatory variables. All these
data exist at the plant level. Our productivity calculations do not capture any headquarters or divisional
level costs that are not reported at the plant-level (i.e. overhead, research and development). The ASM
also does not state the actual quantity shipped by each plant, but shows only the value of shipments. We
thus deﬂate the value of shipments by 1982 price deﬂators to get a real value of shipments. For all inputs
and outputs measured in dollars, we adjust for inﬂation by using four-digit SIC deﬂator data from the
Bartelsman and Gray (1994) database. Each input has to have a non-zero reported value. Kovenock
9This standardization does not aﬀect the results we report. The results have similar levels of signiﬁcance when we do not
standardize productivity in this manner.
12and Phillips (1997) describe these inputs and the method for accounting for inﬂation and depreciation of
capital stock in more detail.
iv. Firm and Industry Control Variables
We also include other ﬁrm and industry variables in our regressions. We include the log of ﬁrm size
and the number of plants operated by the ﬁrm at the beginning of the year. We also include the log of
target size divided by acquirer size as a measure of relative size for the target to the acquirer. We deﬁne
ﬁrm size as the total deﬂated value (using industry price deﬂators) of shipments in 1982 dollars. We also
include four industry-level variables: INDRET - the two-year buy and hold return for the Fama-French 48-
industry group to which a target plant belongs, industry R&D ratio, INDMARG - the industry operating
margin, and the standard deviation of the industry operating margin (SD - INDMARG). Industry R&D
(IND R&D) is calculated as the sum of ﬁrm-level R&D from Compustat at the three-digit SIC code level,
divided by the sum of ﬁrm-level sales in each year. INDMARG is the sum of ﬁrm-level operating income
before depreciation from Compustat at the three-digit SIC code level, divided by the sum of ﬁrm-level
sales in each year. SD - INDMARG is the standard deviation of the industry operating margin using the
last ten years of data.
3.3 Characteristics of Acquirers and Targets
Table 2 describes the cross-sectional characteristics of the ﬁrms involved in the transaction. In columns 2
and 3, we report the mean and median market value and book-to-market decile of targets for each sample
year. The book to market ratio is computed from COMPUSTAT data following the algorithm of Fama and
French. We obtain the cutoﬀs for the deciles of the distribution of BE/ME from Ken French’s website for
the relevant year. The market value of each ﬁrm is also obtained as the market value in the December of
the year prior to the transaction and is assigned deciles based on Ken French’s website. Target ﬁrms tend
to have below median market capitalization. The median target’s market capitalization decile is under
3 in every year except 1982. In each year the target ﬁrms’ book-to-market deciles are higher than their
corresponding book-to decile. However, the median target’s book-to-market decile is consistently below
the market’s median book-to-market decile. The target’s mean book-to-market decile never exceeds 5.84,
attained in 1991.
Insert Table 2 here
13Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 report the industry-adjusted margins of plants owned by acquirers and
targets in the year prior to the acquisition. We ﬁnd that both acquirers and targets operate proﬁtable
plants that tend to earn above-industry margins. For 16 out of 18 years covered by our sample, the median
industry-adjusted margins of acquirer-owned plants are positive. Target owned plants display a similar
pattern. In 15 out of 18 years, industry-adjusted margins of acquirers exceed those of targets, suggesting
that acquirers are more productive than targets.
The last two columns of Table 2 report data on the deﬂated shipments of acquirers and targets. The
median deﬂated shipments of acquirer plants are between 1.5 and 7.7 times the median shipments of target
plants. Thus, manufacturing plants of acquirers tend to be larger than plants operated by targets. The
ratio of plant sizes is somewhat lower than the (unreported) ratio of market values of acquirers to targets,
reﬂecting the fact that in our sample, acquirers not only own larger plants than targets but also operate
more plants than targets.
Table 3 describes the cross-sectional characteristics of the sample ﬁrms involved in merger transactions.
We report the mean and median market value and book-to-market decile of acquirers and targets for each
sample year for subsample of transactions for which the acquiring ﬁrm in each transaction is matched in
COMPUSTAT as well as LRD. As a result of this requirement, the sample of transactions in Table 3 is
smaller than in Table 2. Thus, only data pertaining to transactions in which the acquirer is listed in the
US is reported in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 here
Except for 1983, the median and mean BE/ME deciles for acquirers are below 5. The median and mean
BE/ME deciles for acquirers are signiﬁcantly lower in the 1990s, when they are close to 2. Interestingly,
targets also tend to have median and mean BE/ME below 5, as in the larger sample in Table 2. Thus, the
typical participants in M&A activities, whether on the acquirer or the target side, tend to be growth ﬁrms
rather than distressed or value ﬁrms. The evidence on acquirer and target BE/ME deciles proﬁtability
as well as the diﬀerences between these is consistent with the evidence on operating margins in Table 3.
The data suggest that the low BE/ME deciles of both sets of ﬁrms, and the higher BE/ME for acquirers
relative to targets at least partly reﬂects diﬀerences in the productivity of these two sets of ﬁrms. One
interpretation of this pattern is that the opportunity cost of suboptimally used capacity is high when there
are more growth opportunities, so mergers tend to concentrate in ﬁrms and time periods in which there
are more growth opportunities. Alternatively, it is also possible that mergers tend to occur when market
14valuations are relatively high, perhaps because ﬁrms can use their stock as currencies for acquiring other
companies, as in Shleifer and Vishny (2003).
Columns 4 and 5 report the market value deciles to which acquirers and targets belong . As in Fama and
French, market value decile is deﬁned as the decile of the market capitalization of equity with cutoﬀsb a s e d
on all NYSE ﬁrms. Not surprisingly, the evidence indicates that acquirers are much larger than targets.
Except for 1981, the median and mean market capitalization decile for acquirers exceeds 5. Median and
mean target market value deciles are consistently below 4. In terms of actual market capitalization, the
median acquirer size by year ranges $381mm to $1.9 billion, about ten times the median size of targets.
Acquirers in the late 1990s tend to have especially high market values relative to the target size.
4 The Decision to Sell, Keep, or Close Target Plants
4.1 Unconditional Results
Table 4 describes the status of target-owned plants acquired in a merger at the end of three years after the
merger. There is a surprising degree of turnover of just-acquired plants in our sample even in the relatively
narrow window of three years. In the aggregate sample, 12,893 plants change hands in acquisitions. Of
these, only 6,731 (or 52.2%) continue to be operated by the acquirer 3 years after the acquisition is
completed. Of the remaining, 2,298, or 18% are closed, while 3,339 (26%) of the plants are sold oﬀ.T h e s e
numbers do not add up to 100% as we do not know the ﬁnal outcome for some plants. We do not know
the outcome for some plants because as discussed above, plants only remain in the ASM survey at the end
of each ﬁve year panel if they have at least 200 employees.
Insert Table 4 here
The high proportion of target plants that are sold suggests that empire building is not the sole driver of
acquisitions. However, from the unconditional proportion it is not clear whether disposals are in accordance
with theories of comparative advantage. To test these hypotheses, we discuss how the proportion of
plants acquired depends on the size of the acquisition, acquirer characteristics, industry conditions, the
characteristics of the acquired plants and their position in the organizational structure of the target.
154.2 Disposition by number of plants acquired
In Table 4 we classify targets based on the number of target plants transferred in the M&A transaction. We
s o r tt h es a m p l ei n t oﬁve bins: 1-5 plants acquired, 6-10 plants acquired, 11-25 plants acquired, 26-50 plants
acquired, and more than 51 plants acquired. We examine whether the tendency to dispose of acquired
plants is more pronounced when a large number of target plants are acquired. This outcome is likely, for
instance, if the acquirer has a comparative advantage in operating only some of a multi-division targets
lines of business or if it buys multi-plant targets with a view to the view of creating value by breaking up
the plants, as in the bustup mergers analyzed by Berger and Ofek (1996).
Table 4 suggests that the tendency to dispose of plants is not necessarily concentrated in multi-plant
target acquisitions. To the ﬁrst order, the fraction of the target plants kept at the end of year 3 by the
acquirer remains ﬂat at about 55% when up to 50 plants are transferred in acquisitions. The kept proportion
declines to about 52% when more than 50 plants are acquired. About one quarter of all plants acquired
are sold oﬀ by year 3 and this proportion is roughly ﬂat regardless of how many plants are transferred in
the acquisition. The probability of plant closure is 16% if only 1-5 plants are transferred in the acquisition
and is relatively ﬂat at about 20% when at least ﬁve plants are transferred in the merger transaction.
4.3 Disposition in the 1980s versus 1990s
The merger wave in the 1980s is often characterized as a response to undo the conglomerate expansion
wave of the 1970s and 1960s. If so, the probability either retaining a plant should be higher in the 1990s
compared to the 1980s. Table 4 shows that the overall percentage of kept plants is higher at 59% in
the 1990s deals compared to 50% in the 1980s. Also, the total number of plants in large acquisitions
involving at least 51 plants, in which the undoing of ineﬃciently large conglomerates is more likely to be a
prime objective, is 2,497 plants in the 1980s, almost 55% more than the 1,596 plants transferred in large
acquisitions in the 1990s.
4.4 Relatedness
We next classify the post-merger disposition decision by the type of acquisition. If expansion of managerial
scope motivates related acquisitions, as in MP related acquisitions should result in greater retention of
target plants. On the other hand, if acquisitions are carried out with the view of shutting down extra
capacity, perhaps for reasons of maximizing proﬁts in an oligopolistic setting, there could be more closures
16in related acquisition. Anti-trust concerns would also predict lower likelihood of retention in acquisitions
that are related, since anti-trust concerns would require less retention in cases where there are related
acquisitions.
We measure relatedness on the plant level, based on whether target plants have the same 3-digit SIC
code as an acquirer’s main division, as described earlier in the variable section above. In our sample,
4,080 related plants are acquired while 8,813 plants are not related. We ﬁnd that 55% of related plants are
kept while 51% of unrelated plants are kept. There are similar diﬀerences in the selloﬀ decision. 22.5% of
related plants are sold oﬀ while 27.5% of unrelated plants are sold oﬀ.
5 Disposal of Plants: Multinomial Logit
We model the decision to keep, sell, or close a target plant acquired after a merger using a multinomial
logit model. The dependent variable in this model is 0, 1, or 2 depending on whether the plant is sold,
kept, or closed, respectively. Thus, the baseline decision is to keep a plant, and Table 5 reports estimates
for the decision to sell oﬀ an acquired target plant (upper Panel) or the decision to close the plant (lower
Panel) relative to the baseline decision to keep. The results in Table 5 focus on statistical signiﬁcance. To
assess the economic impact of the explanatory variables in the logit speciﬁcation .we report estimates of
the marginal eﬀects in Table 6.
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here
Panels A and B of Table 5 show the estimated coeﬃcients in the decision to sell or close an acquired
plant, respectively. We report estimates of ﬁve speciﬁcations that vary according to the explanatory vari-
ables included in the model. We divide the explanatory variables into several groups. One group includes
characteristics of the transacting ﬁrms and the plants position in their organizational structure. The second
group pertains to the target plants’ industry. The ﬁnal group of explanatory variables includes the addi-
tional acquirer’s characteristics and interactions with industry variables, allowing us to test our predictions
about eﬃcient disposal decisions. Speciﬁcation (1) reports the eﬀect of the target plant characteristics to
test hypotheses H1 and H2. Acquirer characteristics are added in speciﬁcation (2). Here, we also introduce
a dummy variable for the 1980s time period to control for the potential changes in the disposal decision
between the 1980s and the 1990s. Acquirer operating margins and skill variables are added in speciﬁcation
(3) to test H5 and H6. Finally, speciﬁcations (4)-(5) show the eﬀects of several industry-level variables on
17the plant disposal decision to test hypotheses H3, H4, and H5. As in Table 5, Panels A and B of Table 6
focus on the marginal eﬀects related to the sell and close decisions, respectively, while Panel C reports the
marginal eﬀects for the keep decision.
5.1 Target Characteristics
Panels A and B of Tables 5 and 6 show that plants that are related ( a plant that produces in a similar
3-digit SIC code) to the acquirer’s existing divisions and the centrality (TMAIN) of the plant in the target’s
organization are less likely to be sold than a similar plant belonging to the target’s peripheral divisions.
Both variables are statistically signiﬁcant and economically material and their eﬀects persist across all
the speciﬁcations in the tables which include industry and acquirer’s characteristics. At the median of
the sample data, the marginal eﬀects of belong to the target’s main division and being in an industry
related to the acquirer are of similar magnitude and each reduce the probability of the plant being sold by
approximately 13% in most speciﬁcations.
The next variable in the logit model is the industry-adjusted proﬁtability of a target plant, TMARG.
We expect that proﬁtable plants are a priori less likely to be closed, but it is not clear what relation plant
proﬁtability should have to the decision to sell a plant. Weaker plants may have the greater potential for
improvement, suggesting a positive relation between selloﬀ and plant proﬁtability. On the other hand,
earlier work such as Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) suggest that in
the long-term selloﬀs occur for weaker plants. We ﬁnd evidence for this view. The TMARG proﬁtability
variable is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of the decision to sell and it has a negative coeﬃcient. The
marginal eﬀect of a target plant’s operating margin lowers the odds of a selloﬀ between 8 and 9 percent.
Target plant proﬁtability matters even after including other controls for the decision to sell. On the
retention decision,the marginal eﬀect of a plant’s operating margin is associated with a 18 to 19% increase
in probability that the plant will be retained. Proﬁtability is also signiﬁcant in explaining the closure
decision, as expected by a signiﬁcant 9 percent.
T h ev a r i a b l eT M A R Gc o n t r o l sf o rp r o ﬁtability at the plant level. We supplement this with the target
book-to-market ratio as a potential predictor of the disposition decision. The associated variable, TBEME,
which is the BE/ME decile to which a target belongs. TBEME should capture the future proﬁtability or
the growth prospects of targets, at the level of the enterprise being acquired. The target ﬁrm’s book-to-
market ratio is positively related to the probability of sale at signiﬁcance levels of between 1% and 10%
18depending on speciﬁcation.10 An alternative interpretation is that high TBEME indicates targets with low
valuations. Thus, a positive coeﬃcient for TBEME indicates that low valued targets are more likely to
result in a post-merger asset sale, perhaps because the target’s portfolio of assets was suboptimal. Table 6
indicates that the marginal eﬀect of book-to-market is more modest than that of TMARG, ranging from
1% to 3% in the selloﬀ decision at signiﬁcance levels ranging from 1% to 10%. TBEME has relatively little
eﬀect on the closure decision, where it tends to be economically and statistically insigniﬁcant.
5.2 Acquirer Characteristics
Speciﬁcation # 2 introduces controls for acquirer size. We include three proxies for size: the size of the
acquirer relative to target size (TRELSIZE), the logarithm of the deﬂated output and following Table 4,
the number of plants transferred in the acquisition. The coeﬃcient for the aggregate acquirer output is
positive, suggesting that large acquirers are more likely to divest target plants. The marginal eﬀect of this
variable is only about 1%. Neither the relative size of the target nor the number of plants transferred is
signiﬁcant.
Speciﬁcation #3 introduces other acquirer characteristics. The overall acquirer margin, AMARG, is
insigniﬁcant, so the probability that a plant is sold does not depend on the acquirer’s operating margin.
In particular, more proﬁtable acquirers do not sell plants with a higher probability than less proﬁtable
acquirers. Turning to the tests of the predictions that plant sales are consistent with neoclassical models
of ﬁrm scope, we ﬁnd that in speciﬁcations (3) and (4) that as predicted, the proﬁtability of acquirer’s
peripheral plants (ASKILL) reduces the probability that the acquirer will sell an acquired plant. Thus, a
ﬁrm whose marginal divisions have low proﬁtability is less likely to retain a newly acquired plant. From
Table 6, the marginal eﬀect i economically signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation in the eﬃciency of
peripheral divisions, holding all other factors including ﬁrm wide operating margins constant, is associated
with a 17% increase in the probability of the plant being retained.
The signiﬁcance of ASKILL is consistent with the prediction that as a ﬁrm’s scope increases, its ability to
operate plants eﬃciently at the margin decreases. A ﬁrm whose marginal divisions are relatively ineﬃcient
is less likely to increase its size by retaining plants acquired in a merger, holding all other things equal. The
signiﬁcance of ASKILL is particularly striking in light of the insigniﬁcance of the overall acquirer margin,
AMARG. In other words, the acquirer’s average industry-adjusted operating margin does not aﬀect the
10Note that high values of book-to-market are associated with higher target plant sales even after controlling for industry
margins, stock price run-ups and R&D levels in speciﬁcations (4) and (5).
19disposition decision signiﬁcantly. The decision to retain a plant is function of the acquirer’s ability at the
margin, not of the acquirer’s total cash ﬂow, precisely as predicted by the neoclassical view.
5.3 Industry Characteristics
Speciﬁcations (4) and (5) in Table 5 introduce several industry variables. These variables capture the
industry conditions because the decision to retain or sell a plant is likely to depend on the value of assets
to other industry participants Furthermore, the changing opportunities in the industry, which is captured
by industry variability, could also aﬀect the decision to sell a plant.
Speciﬁcation (4) shows that plants in industries that experience a large run up in market valuation
have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of being sold, as shown by the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of INDRET.
Table 6 shows that a one standard deviation in INDRET increases the probability of an asset sale by 3%.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) argue that the opportunity cost of retaining a large plant following a posi-
tive shock in the industry is likely to be higher for a less eﬃcient producer. Such producers are more likely
to sell their capacity following a positive industry shock. We test for this in speciﬁcation (6) by interacting
the industry return runup (INDRET) with the eﬃciency of the acquirer’s peripheral divisions (ASKILL).
Consistent with the Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) prediction, while newly acquired plants are more likely
to be sold following positive industry returns, these sales are less likely to occur when the acquirer is not
eﬃcient in running in running peripheral divisions. Eﬃcient acquirers are signiﬁcantly less to sell plants
following a positive shock their industry than at other times. From Table 6, the estimated marginal eﬀects
of the acquirer’s peripheral proﬁtability following positive industry shocks on the probability of sale are
highly material. In speciﬁcation (5), a one standard deviation increase in the interacted variable results in
a 55% reduction in the probability of a plant sale.
Table 5 also reports coeﬃcients for other variables. Plant sales following mergers are more likely in high
R&D industries. Greater variability in industry margins is not related to the probability of sale. However,
the level of industry margin matters. Sales are more likely when industries have high operating margins. A
one standard deviation in operating margin increases the probability of sales by an economically signiﬁcant
12%. We also ﬁnd evidence that the time period matters. The 1980 dummy variable has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect. The rate of plant sales is approximately 4% higher in the 1980s.
The estimates for the probability of plant closure are presented in Panel B of Table 5, with the marginal
eﬀects presented in Panel B of Table 6. Acquired plants in the target’s main division, plants with high
20operating margins and plants in industries related to the acquirer are less likely to be closed. Plants in
mergers where the target is large relative to the acquirer, and where the acquirer itself is large are also
likely to be closed. We also ﬁnd other signiﬁcant industry eﬀects. The probability of a closure of an
acquired plant is higher in high R&D industries, industries with high operating margins and industries
in which the dispersion of plant productivities is high. Closures were signiﬁcantly higher in the 1980’s,
running at an about 7-9% higher rate as shown in Panel B of Table 6.
In contrast to the sales decision, we do not ﬁnd that the decision to close a plant is related to the
productivity of the acquirer’s peripheral divisions, the run-up is stock prices, or the interaction of the
two. Thus, closure does not depend on changes in the opportunity cost of operating the plant by the
acquirer or another producer. Similarly, the acquirer’s operating margin does not predict plant closures.
The requirement that the NPV be non-negative for the plant to remain open is less likely to be sensitive
to the marginal changes in the comparative advantage of the owner, especially since the opportunity cost
of closing the plant is selling it to the highest bidder, whose bid may change in diﬀerent ways from that
of the owner in response to an industry shock. This contrasts with the sale decision, which is sensitive
to shifts in the relative opportunity costs of ownership, which themselves changes as the eﬃciencies of
diﬀerent producers in the industry shift in response to industry shocks.
Tables 5 and 6 were also reestimated replacing all the industry variables by 3-digit industry dummies.
With one exception, the coeﬃcient estimates for acquirer and target variables were within 5% of values
reported here, and at the same level of signiﬁcance. The exception is the coeﬃcient of ASKILL, which
increased from a 5% to a 1% level of signiﬁcance with the 3-digit industry dummies.
Taken together the ﬁndings in Tables 5 and 6 provide strong evidence that acquiring ﬁrms on average
make economically rational asset disposal decisions. Assets in the target’s main divisions and assets that
are in industries related to acquirer are more likely to be retained. Assets whose opportunity costs have
increased are more likely to be sold. Acquirers who are eﬃcient in operating marginal plants are more
likely to retain purchased plants. In particular, acquirers who are eﬃcient at operating marginal plants
are more likely to retain them following positive shocks to the industry. There are the states in which the
neoclassical model predicts that the acquirer has a higher comparative advantage in retaining the plant.
Importantly, the decision to dispose or retain the asset depends on the eﬃciency of the acquirer’s marginal
plants.
215.3.1 Method of Payment
We also included (but do not report) the method of payment as an explanatory variable. Ex-ante, one
m i g h te x p e c tt h a ts e l l o ﬀs and closures are more likely in acquisitions that are cash ﬁnanced. Accordingly,
we included in the multinomial logit model a binary variable that equals 1 if an acquisition is ﬁnanced
with at least 51% cash and is zero otherwise. We ﬁnd that the method of ﬁnancing an acquisition is not
signiﬁcant in explaining the disposition decisions, both statistically and economically.
In unreported results, we also consider an instrumental variables speciﬁcation to further explore whether
predicted stock explained the disposition decision. Accordingly, we reestimate the logit equation in Table 5
with instruments for the stock variable. Our instruments include the acquirer’s industry average R&D ex-
penditure to sales, the industry level market-to-book ratio, the industry-adjusted proﬁtability, the standard
deviation of the industry-adjusted proﬁtability, and whether an acquirer is a conglomerate. The predicted
stock variable is insigniﬁcant. These results suggest that the ﬁnancing side matters less in determining
post-merger restructuring compared to asset side considerations about what type of assets ﬁtb e s ti nt h e
merged entity.
6 Post-Merger Performance
Plants obtained in an acquisition can be kept, sold, or closed oﬀ after the acquisition. Not surprisingly,
closed plants tend to shrink and have poor proﬁtability prior to their closure; we do not report the
performance data for these plants. In this section, we analyze the changes in performance of the remaining
plants, which are still in operation at the end of year 3 after the acquisition is completed. We partition
our sample into kept plants and sold oﬀ plants and analyze the changes for each sub-sample separately.
We also analyze the cross-sectional determinants of the performance changes within each sample.
6.1 Unconditional Changes in Performance
We examine changes in the performance of acquired plants over a four-year window, from t − 1 to t +3 ,
around the merger. We measure performance by the post-merger changes in the operating margins and
productivity of the acquired plants. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and
Schoar (2002), we ﬁnd that acquired plants on average increase in performance in the three year window.
We do not report these results. However, when we separate the acquired plants into those sold by the
22acquirer during this window, and those kept, we ﬁnd striking diﬀerences in performance between kept and
sold plants.11
Insert Table 7 here
Table 7 reports the data on post-acquisition performance of acquired plants. The upper panel reports
data for kept plants while the lower panel deals with sold plants. As discussed in Section 3.2, we employ
two measures of performance: the total factor productivity (TFP), which is reported in the ﬁrst row of
each panel, and the adjusted operating margin, which is reported in the second row of a panel. Table 7
reports the TFP or margin level as of year -1 and the changes in these measures between year -1 and years
+1, +2, and +3.
We ﬁnd that on an unconditional basis, kept plants tend to be strong performing prior to acquisition
and these plants continue their strong performance after the merger. For instance, the average change
in TFP for kept plants over the three year window is 6.3% while the average change in margin is about
2.1% and both are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Sold plants also have positive performance changes although
these changes are less pronounced than changes for kept plants. The average TFP change for sold plants is
about 2.7% while the improvement in operating margin is 0.7%, both signiﬁcant at the 10% level, which are
between a half and one third the corresponding changes for kept plants. The evidence seems less consistent
with the view that mergers are motivated by empire building and hubris and more in line with the view
that acquirers keep the portions of the target that they can improve operationally but tend to shed the
assets in which they have no comparative advantage in running.
6.2 Changes in Performance and Acquirer and Target Characteristics
The summary statistics in Table 7 reﬂect unconditional changes in performance. We next present regression
results that condition on acquirer and target characteristics as predictors of future performance changes.
We adjust for selection eﬀects by employing a switching regression with endogenous switching (Maddala
(1983) or Li and Prabhala (2007)).
In the underlying choice model, let VK,i be the latent value to an acquirer from keeping the plant i and
11We also separately analyze plants that are closed between t and t +3 . As expected, plants that were closed plants tend
to shrink and have poor proﬁtability prior to their closure. We exclude closed plants from all subsequent analysis.
23VS,i the latent value from selling plant i. We specify the latent functions as
VD,i = ZD,iγD + ηD,i (2)
where the decision to keep or sell is Dε{K, S}, ZD,i denotes observable explanatory variables and ηD,i
denotes unobserved or private information about the value of the plant, given the decision D. We specify
the selection mechanism based on standard methodology in the limited dependent variable literature. An
acquirer keeps asset i if VK,i >V S,i and sells the asset otherwise. If a plant is kept, the change in productive
eﬃciency is ∆YK,i and if it is sold, the change in productive eﬃciency is a potentially diﬀerent function
∆YS,i. We specify the change in productive eﬃciency in each case as the regression system
∆YK,i = XK,iβK +  K,i (3)
∆YS,i = XS,iβS +  S,i (4)
In the system of equations (2) and (3)-(4), there are two possible outcomes for each acquired plant,
either it is kept or sold. However, we observe only one outcome, the actual outcome arising out the ﬁrm’s
choice. We do not observe the counterfactual outcome. For instance, if a ﬁrm keeps an acquired plant i,
we observe the fact that it kept the plant and the change in its productive eﬃciency ∆YK,i but we do not
explicitly observe the productivity change which would have occurred had the ﬁrm chosen to sell the plant,
∆YS,i. However, we can determine whether the average eﬃciency of kept plants would be higher or lower
if the kept plant were instead divested from the estimates of system (2) and (3)-(4).
We estimate the switching regression system using a two step method. In step 1, we estimate the choice
model implied by equation (2). The probit estimates are qualitatively similar to the estimates from the
multinomial coeﬃcient for the probability of selling a plant in Table 5. For brevity, we do not discuss these
results again. In step 2, the inverse Mills ratio is included in each of the equations (3) and (4) and the
regression coeﬃcients βK and βS are estimated. Tables 8 and 9 analyze the post-merger changes in the
operating margins and productivity of the acquired plants that are the retained by the acquirer and those
that the acquirer sells.
Insert Table 8 here
Tables 8 reports regression results in which the dependent variable is the change in performance for
kept target plants. The change in performance is measured from the year prior to the merger to three
24years after. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) in Table 8, the left columns, report the results when performance is
measured using TFP. The two columns to the right use operating margins as the measure of eﬃciency. As
in Section 2, our dependent variable is the change in performance adjusted for the predictable portion of
performance changes.
From Table 8, the variable TMARG, the ex-ante proﬁtability of the target plant, has a negative
coeﬃcient. It is signiﬁcant in three of the four speciﬁcations, consistent with the view that underperforming
plants that are kept tend to improve more after mergers. The second variable, AMARG, denotes the
current (industry-adjusted) proﬁtability of acquirers. If above-industry margins reﬂects acquirer skill,
more proﬁtable acquirers should be more likely to improve future proﬁtability of plants that they elect to
keep. The evidence is supportive of this view. AMARG is signiﬁcant and has a positive sign in Table 7
This is in contrast to the insigniﬁcance of the AMARG in the decision to keep or sell a plant in Table 5.
This diﬀerence in coeﬃcients across the equations suggests that while an acquirer whose plants are more
proﬁtable on average does not have an advantage in operating an average acquired plant, for those plants
for which there is a match between the acquirer’s skill and the target plant, so that VK,i >V S,i,h i g h e r
acquirer productivity leads to improved performance.
The third variable is ASKILL, or the skill of the acquirer in the peripheral divisions. We ﬁnd that this
variable has a positive coeﬃcient and it is signiﬁcant. Thus, ﬁrms with relatively more expertise in running
their peripheral businesses tend to improve the productive eﬃciency of the plants they keep. This ﬁnding
is consistent with neoclassical theories of the ﬁrm would suggest that ﬁrms who are relatively skilled in
running their peripheral businesses should be more likely to make improvements in the plants they keep.
The ﬁnding is not predicted by agency theories that suggest that plant acquisition and retention is an
outcome of agency-motivated empire building by ﬁrms who spend cash generated by main divisions that
happen to be proﬁtable.
Other variables in our speciﬁcation include TRELSIZE, the size of the target relative to acquirer size,
following Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1991), who argue that gains are likely to be more concentrated in
relatively smaller acquisitions. We ﬁnd little evidence for a size eﬀect in explaining the gains in productive
eﬃciency of kept plants. This suggests that the gains related to size reported in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback
may be attributable to economies of scale in reducing overheads rather than synergistic gains arising out
of manufacturing eﬃciencies. In unreported results, we also used the number of plants acquired as an
alternative proxy for size; it was insigniﬁcant and had little eﬀect on the other coeﬃcients.
We include the acquired target’s book-to-market ratio, TBEME, as a control variable. Plants may have
25unobserved future eﬃciency gains not reﬂected in current productivity levels. TBEME should capture this
eﬀect, to the extent it is capitalized in target ﬁrms’ share prices. There is no consistent pattern in the data.
In one speciﬁcation (TFP, column 1), TBEME does have a negative sign and it is economically signiﬁcant,
but the variable is not signiﬁcant elsewhere.
We also include a dummy for the 1980s time period. This variable controls for the hypothesis that
target plant eﬃciency gains may be a pure 1980s eﬀect. Perhaps the deconglomeration wave of the 1980s
corrected ineﬃcient resource allocation in conglomerates formed in the 1960s and 1970s, while the 1990s
mergers are pure ﬁnancial transactions caused by ﬁrms exploiting overvalued stock. We ﬁnd no support
for this view. There is mixed evidence on the signiﬁcance of the 1980s dummy: it is signiﬁcant in one
speciﬁcation but not in the others. However, all coeﬃcients, including the signiﬁcant one, are negative. If
the eﬃciency gains are time period eﬀects, they are more concentrated in the 1990s rather than the 1980s.
Thus, even if the 1990s merger wave are caused by ﬁrms exploiting their overvalued stock as acquisition
currency, it is still the case that the acquisitions resulted in more productive eﬃciency gains for the kept
plants.
For both the TFP speciﬁcation and the operating margin speciﬁcation, we report two speciﬁcations that
incorporate acquirer-related stock market information. As before, the requirement that we have acquirer
data shrinks our sample. For instance, we have a sample of 4.239 plants in the TFP speciﬁcations that do
not require acquirer data, but the sample is 2,356 plants when we impose the requirement that acquirer
stock market data is available. Interestingly, the acquirer BE/ME has a negative coeﬃcient. It is not
signiﬁcant in the TFP speciﬁcation but is signiﬁcant at 1% in the operating margin speciﬁcation. These
results show that low BE/ME acquirers, i.e., glamour acquirers, are able to achieve greater eﬃciency gains
in the targets’ plants they keep. If acquisitions merely reﬂect bidders using overvalued stock to pay for
targets, we would not necessarily see greater real eﬃciency gains concentrated among glamour bidders.
Our view is that using overvalued stock as currency is probably not the whole story for why acquisitions
occur. While ﬁrms do probably use their stock as currency for acquisitions, the systematic variation in the
pieces they keep after such acquisitions also needs to be explained in such a theory.
The second acquirer stock market variable is DIAGONAL, which is equal to 1 if the BE/ME ratios
of the target and acquirer are similar. This variable tests the synergy hypothesis of Rhodes-Kropf and
Robinson in which synergies motivate mergers acquirers and targets with similar BE/ME ratios. The
synergy hypothesis would predict that eﬃciency gains would be greater if the merger occurs between ﬁrms
with similar BE/ME ratios. Empirically, we specify a merger as a being a diagonal merger if the absolute
26value of the diﬀerence in BE/ME of the acquirer and that of the target is less than 1. We ﬁnd no evidence
that the economic gains are more when the merger is between similar BE/ME ﬁrms. In fact, the point
estimate is negative and signiﬁcant at between 10% and 1%, suggesting that oﬀ-diagonal mergers tend to
lead to more subsequent eﬃciency gains in plant operations. If such synergies exist, the place to look for
these is in the administrative or headquarter level overheads of ﬁrms rather than operating level eﬃciency
changes.
The selection term, the inverse Mills ratio, has a negative coeﬃcient in all speciﬁcations. It is signiﬁcant
at 10% in the TFP speciﬁcations and at 1% in the operating margin speciﬁcation for the full sample
but it is insigniﬁcant in the smaller sample that requires acquirer stock market data. The inverse Mills
ratio variable is the expectation of the unobserved error term, or the private information, in the probit
speciﬁcation modeling whether a plant is kept or sold. For the kept plant sample, the inverse Mills ratio
takes negative values because it is the expectation of the unobserved error given that a plant is kept given
that probit dependent variable is 1 if a plant is sold and zero if the plant is kept. Thus, a negative coeﬃcient
for the inverse Mills ratio indicates that the unobserved private information that makes ﬁrms more likely
to keep plants is positively related to the change in plant performance.
Insert Table 9 here
Table 9 reports the results for sold plants. Theories make no particular predictions about eﬃciency
c h a n g e sf o rt h es o l dp l a n t s .T h u s ,i tm a yn o tb es u r p r i s ing that sold plants show few of the patterns for kept
plants. A common element in both kept plants and sold plants is that plants that tend to underperform
ex-ante tend to show greater future improvements. Interestingly, the relative size of the target plant is
negatively related to changes in eﬃciency, while target size is insigniﬁcant in the kept equation. Thus,
increases in eﬃciency in sold plants are concentrated in the subset of small plants sold oﬀ by acquirers.
Interestingly, the 1980s dummy variable is insigniﬁcant. If the 1980s mergers were intended to undo
agency-related ineﬃciencies of large conglomerates, one might expect that the post-merger selloﬀsi nt h e
1980s should result in greater productive eﬃciency gains for sold plants. However, the coeﬃcient for 1980s
is insigniﬁcant, and in any case, the point estimate is negative in all speciﬁcations. Thus, we ﬁnd no support
for the view that the plants sold oﬀ during the 1980s deconglomeration wave became more eﬃcient in the
hands of the new owners.
The results in Tables 8 and 9 can be used to construct estimates of the counterfactual changes in
productivity that would occur had the acquirer chosen to sell (keep) the plants that were kept (sold). From
27equation (3), the counterfactual eﬃciency gain if kept plants were sold equals ∆YK,i−∆YS,i, whose expected
value is XK,iβK −XS,iβS. Likewise, the expected productivity sold plant were kept, its productivity would
be XS,iβS − XK,βK. The results are interesting. For sold plants, the operating margin would be lower by
0.33% on average (t-statistic = 1.40) if the plant were kept instead of being sold. The results are quite
strong for plants that are kept. If the kept plants were sold instead, the average abnormal operating margin
would be lower by 2.57% (t-statistic = 18.0). The actual eﬃciency is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent for sold plants
and much higher for plants that are kept relative to the eﬃciency under the unchosen alternative.
Even after adjustment for selection and reversion to the mean in performance, our evidence suggests
that the post-merger asset retention/sale decisions lead to eﬃcient outcomes on average. Sold plants do
not demonstrably improve or deteriorate in performance. However, plants that are retained by acquirers,
which are eﬃcient to begin with as shown in Table 7, become even more eﬃcient on average. We ﬁnd
eﬃciency gains both in an absolute sense and relative to the counterfactual eﬃciency that would be realized
had the plants been sold. Thus, the evidence, after adjustments for selection, remains inconsistent with
empire building. Instead, the acquirer’s appears to be rationally reset on average after a merger. Our
results also reject our last hypothesis that the greatest productivity gains occur when acquirer and target
have similar BE/ME ratios as we only ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on our similarity variable (Diagonal) for
plants that are sold. We ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on the diagonal variable for kept plants consistent with
productivity gains occurring when high-valued acquirers buy low-valued targets.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We analyze the disposition and eﬃciency changes of plants acquired in takeovers of manufacturing ﬁrms
in the US between 1981 and 2000. We ﬁnd that extensive post-merger restructuring takes place. Only
just over a half of the acquired plants are retained by the acquirer for at least three years. Slightly more
than a quarter of the acquired plants are sold within this interval, and the remainder are closed down.
Plants in related transactions and plants that are in the target’s main division are less likely to be sold
whereas plants that are in the target’s peripheral divisions or are unrelated are signiﬁcantly more likely
to be sold. The probability of a plant sale is also higher if the seller market values have increased in the
plant’s industry. The plants that are retained by the acquirers increase in productivity when benchmarked
against industry plants, whereas the sold plants do not.
These outcomes are not consistent with the notion that pure empire building by managers explains
28operating decisions following mergers. The outcomes are more consistent with neoclassical comparative
advantage view of ﬁrm growth in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). In particular, consistent with this view,
low productivity of the acquirer’s existing peripheral plants predicts a higher incidence of sales of acquired
plants. By contrast, the average productivity of the acquirer’s plants does not predict disposal decisions.
Thus, consistent with neoclassical models, the disposal decision depends on marginal, not average, plant
eﬃciency. In addition, acquirers are more likely to retain a plant if they are eﬃcient in the industry and
the industry has experienced a positive shock. These eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant. The marginal
eﬀect of acquirer skill in managing peripheral divisions on the probability of keeping a target plant is 17 to
19%. Moreover, in industries that have experienced a positive shock in the preceding two years this eﬀect
doubles to 39%.
A further implication of the managerial scope based theory of the ﬁrm is that skill in operating periph-
eral divisions should matter more for the selloﬀ decision than the closure decision. We ﬁnd support for
this hypothesis. The acquirer’s peripheral skill variable is not signiﬁcant in explaining the closure decision,
which is largely driven by the proﬁtability of the unit being considered for closure.
Our ﬁndings have broader implications. Given the magnitude of post-merger restructuring reported
here, mergers should not be viewed as discrete events. Rather, each merger should be viewed as an initial
step of a restructuring process that resets the boundaries of the acquiring ﬁrm. Moreover, the resetting of
boundaries appears to follow economically sensible principles. Firms tend to retain plants in which they
have a comparative advantage and improve their productivity. They tend to sell or close other plants.
This restructuring process is not aﬀected by the form of payment used in the merger. Thus, while the
initial decision to acquire a target might involve overpayment, empire building or simple hubris, our results
indicate that economic rationality asserts itself soon afterwards, and that acquirers ﬁnd it advantageous
to enter into post-merger restructuring and deals with other ﬁrms that result, on average, in an improved
allocation of resources following mergers.
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31Table 1
Number of deals
Year # Deals SDC/Compustat # Deals matched to LRD
1981 74 18
1982 87 46
1983 55 41
1984 84 58
1985 86 66
1986 130 104
1987 121 77
1988 162 115
1989 155 102
1990 90 59
1991 56 33
1992 47 28
1993 61 51
1994 70 48
1995 109 66
1996 137 93
1997 154 105
1998 181 113
1999 228 139
2000 212 121
Total 2,309 1,483
Table 1 describes the number of merger transactions in our study. We obtain from the SDC M&A
database a sample of acquisitions in which the announcement date is between 1981 and 2000, the completion
date is within 180 days of the announcement, and the acquisition target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at
least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999. Column 2 reports the number of transactions
in the SDC Platinum that meet all criteria and match to Compustat. Column 3 reports the number of
these transactions with matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at
the U.S. Department of Commerce.
32Table 2
Target and acquirer characteristics: Target data market value available
BE/ME Decile ME decile Adjusted Margin (%) Deﬂated Shipments
Year Target Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target
1981 5.61 (5) 3.89 (2.5) 1.28 0.87 254,814 152,447
1982 5.07 (4) 3.60 (3) 2.46 1.02 178,348 76,465
1983 4.65 (4) 2.5 (1) 3.62 0.57 81,614 42,277
1984 4.98 (5) 2.72 (1) 0.22 2.57 326,670 114,538
1985 4.69 (4) 3.32 (2) 1.69 0.83 237,487 154,729
1986 4.58 (4) 3.18 (2) 2.38 2.22 170,048 95,584
1987 4.85(4) 2.73 (2) 3.21 0.98 293,416 85,519
1988 5.08 (5) 2.63 (2) 5.64 4.36 195,577 119,498
1989 4.38 (4) 3.05 (2) 2.93 -0.48 135,143 65,729
1990 5.18 (4) 3.02 (2) 0.69 7.80 418,129 163,169
1991 5.84 (6) 2.94 (1.5) 0.92 -2.38 422,266 155,766
1992 3.75 (3) 2.93 (2) 1.57 1.57 430,009 55,630
1993 5.09 (4) 2.50 (2) 7.65 0.29 511,955 91,724
1994 4.72 (3) 2.94 (2) 5.63 3.65 377,213 94,126
1995 4.42 (4) 3.02 (2) 4.64 1.40 160,551 64,866
1996 4.76 (4) 2.65 (1) 3.72 2.96 322,041 111,002
1997 4.88 (4) 2.90 (2) 5.17 3.72 524,207 152,392
1998 5.39 (5) 3.06 (2) 3.82 3.07 1,225,467 154,534
1999 5.12 (5) 3.58 (3) 4.65 4.04 2,718,597 146,281
2000 4.73 (4) 3.49 (3) 4.91 3.58 1,455,530 107,710
Table 2 reports the mean and median (in parentheses) of selected characteristics of acquirers and
targets. The sample consists of mergers from the SDC Platinum database in which the announcement date
is between 1981 and 2000, the completion date is within 180 days of the announcement, the acquisition
target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999, and
the target has matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The sample comprises ﬁrms for which the market value of the target is available.
BE/ME decile and ME decile denote the book-to-market and NYSE market capitalization deciles to which
the target belongs based on year t − 1 values. The adjusted margin is the actual operating margin of a
target plant minus the median margin for all plants that have the same 3-digit SIC code. The deﬂated
shipments equals the value of shipments for a plant reported in the ASM adjusted for inﬂation using the
SIC deﬂator from the Bartelsman and Gray (1994) database.
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B E / M Ed e c i l e M Ed e c i l e
Year Acquirer Target Acquirer Target
1981 4.33 (4.5) 4 (4.5) 4 (4) 3.83 (4)
1982 4.25 (4) 4.22 (4) 6.09 (6.5) 3.5 (2.5)
1983 3.14 (3) 4.41 (3) 7.30 (8) 2.48 (1)
1984 5.56 (6) 3.84 (3) 6.45 (7) 4.1 (1.5)
1985 3.05 (3) 3.5 (3) 6.92 (8) 4.42 (3)
1986 3.16 (2) 4.41 (4) 6.74 (8) 3.74 (3)
1987 4.17 (4) 5.08 (4.5) 5.81 (6) 2.58 (2)
1988 3.05 (2) 4.63 (4) 5.96 (6) 2.57 (2)
1989 2.95 (2) 3.64 (3) 5.54 (5.5) 3.64 (3)
1990 3.73 (3) 3.64 (3) 6.64 (6) 3.03 (2)
1991 2.47 (2) 5.43 (5.5) 7.05 (8) 3.18 (2)
1992 2.5 (1.5) 3.53 (3) 6.32 (7) 3.21 (3)
1993 2.58 (1.5) 3.56 (3) 6.46 (8) 3 (2)
1994 2.97 (2) 4.93 (4) 5.78 (6) 3.13 (2)
1995 2.54 (2) 4 (3) 6.91 (8) 3.03 (2)
1996 2.21 (2) 4.45 (4) 6.30 (7) 2.79 (2)
1997 2.73 (2) 4.40 (4) 6.59 (7) 3.19 (2)
1998 3.23 (3) 5.44 (6) 6.39 (7) 3.43 (3)
1999 2.74 (2) 4.81 (4) 7.38 (8) 4.10 (3)
2000 2.75 (2) 4.29 (4) 7.61 (9) 4.23 (3.5)
Table 3 reports the mean and median (in parentheses) of the selected characteristics of acquirers and
targets. The sample consists of mergers from the SDC Platinum database in which the announcement
date is between 1981 and 2000, the completion date is within 180 days of the announcement, and the
target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999 and has
matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the U.S. Department
of Commerce. The sample comprises the acquisitions for which the acquirer and target market values
are available. BE/ME decile and ME decile denote the book-to-market and NYSE market capitalization
deciles based on year t − 1 values.
34Table 4: Disposition of target plants
#P l a n t s #T o t a l #K e p t #C l o s e d #S o l d %K e p t %C l o s e d %S o l d %S o l d
in deal Transferred (Total) (Partial)
Full sample
1-5 1,954 1,030 294 496 56.59% 16.15% 27.20% 9.29%
6-10 1,193 586 233 271 53.76% 21.38% 24.86% 13.67%
11-25 2,316 1,208 441 560 54.69% 19.96% 25.35% 17.79%
26-50 3,337 1,822 547 852 56.57% 16.98% 26.45% 22.07%
≥ 51 4,093 2,085 783 1,160 51.76% 19.44% 28.80% 26.07%
Total 12,893 6,731 2,298 3,339 54.42% 18.58% 27.00% 19.99%
Transactions in 1980s
1-5 766 406 152 189 54.35% 20.35% 25.30% 9.64%
6-10 535 283 131 105 54.53% 25.24% 20.23% 13.10%
11-25 1,035 488 246 281 48.08% 24.24% 27.69% 22.86%
26-50 1,877 992 314 557 53.25% 16.85% 29.80% 22.33%
≥ 51 2,497 1,169 445 874 46.99% 17.89% 35.13% 30.71%
Total 6,710 3,338 1,288 2,006 50.33% 19.42% 30.25% 23.40%
Transaction in 1990s
1-5 1188 624 142 307 58.15% 13.23% 25.61% 9.04%
6-10 658 303 102 166 53.06%% 17.86% 29.08% 14.19%
11-25 1,281 720 195 279 60.30% 16.33% 23.36% 13.48%
26-50 1,460 830 233 295 61.12% 17.16% 21.72% 21.72%
≥ 51 1,596 916 338 286 59.48% 21.95% 18.57% 18.57%
Total 6,183 3,393 1,010 1,333 59.15% 17.61% 23.24% 16.04%
Relatedness
Related 4,080 2,235 723 919 54.78% 17.72% 22.53% 14.12%
Not Related 8,813 4,496 1,575 2,420 51.02% 17.87% 27.46% 21.51%
The sample consists of mergers from the SDC M&A database announced between 1981 and 2000
and completed within 180 days of announcement, in which the target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at
least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999 and has matching input/output data in the
Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Table 4 reports the
year +3 ownership status of plants, where the merger is completed in year 0. Kept plants are still owned
by the acquirer, sold plants are owned by a ﬁrm other than the acquirer, and closed plants are plants that
shut down as of year +3. In each period, we classify the deals by the number of target plants acquired
in the merger transaction 1980s transactions have a completion date between 1981 and 1989 and 1990s
transactions form the complementary set. A target plant is related if it belongs to the same 3-digit SIC
code as a main division of the the acquirer.
35Table 5
Multinomial logit models for disposition
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Decision to sell plant
RELATED -0.53(-8.18)a -0.80(-8.73)a -0.81(-8.67)a -0.75(-7.93)a -0.73(-7.63)a
TMAIN -1.14(-19.79)a -0.91(-13.59)a -0.91(-13.69)a -0.95(-14.02)a -0.95(-13.94)a
TBEME 0.15(3.42)a 0.09(1.77)c 0.08(1.62) 0.10(2.03)b 0.09(1.81)c
TMARG -0.67(-6.00)a -0.76(-6.42)a -0.75(-6.22)a -0.78(-6.36)a -0.78(-6.4)a
AMARG -0.07(-0.24) -0.31(-0.98) -0.31(-1.00)
INDRET 0.19(2.37)b 0.20(2.54)b
ASKILL -0.94(-2.47)b -1.00(-2.59)b - 0.093 (-0.19)
ASKILL* INDRET -3.22(-3.05)a
IND R&D 3.69(2.83)a 3.53(2.7)a
SD (INDMARG) -0.55(-0.56) -. 563 (-0.57)
INDMARG 1.01(3.23)a 0.99(3.18)a
TRELSIZE 0.08(1. 54) 0.08(1.52) 0.06(1.24) 0.06(1.26)
LN (AOUTPUT) 0.06(2.45)b 0.05(2.37)b 0.05(2.16)b 0.05(2.18)b
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.66) 0.00(0.67) 0.00(0.8) 0.00(0.73)
1980s 0.28(4.54)a 0.27(4.45)a 0.32(5.07)a 0.32(4.98)a
Constant -0.17(-2.68)a -0.86(-2.79)a -0.82(-2.63)a -1.06(-2.91)a -1.07(-2.93)a
Dependent Variable: Decision to close plant
RELATED -0.32(-4.63)a -0.43(-4.24)a -0.43(-4.18)a -0.35(-3.33)a -0.35(-3.36)a
TMAIN -0.37(-6.58)a -0.46(-6.72)a -0.46(-6.77)a -0.49(-7.01)a -0.49(-7.02)a
TBEME 0.13(2.79)a -0.01(-0.22) -0.01(-0.22) 0.05(0.86) 0.04(0.85)
TMARG -0.69(-5.92)a -0.77(-6.27)a -0.79(-6.17)a -0.75(-5.87)a -0.75(-5.86)a
AMARG 0.12(0.39) -0.14(-0.46) -0.15(-0.49)
INDRET 0.06(0.67) 0.06 (0.7)
ASKILL -0.45(-1.17) -0.54(-1.4) -0.64(-1.42)
ASKILL* INDRET 0.19 (0.19)
IND R&D 4.86(3.72)a 4.88(3.73)a
SD (INDMARG) 2.55(2.4)b 2.55(2.4)b
INDMARG 1.10(3.37)a 1.09(3.33)a
TRELSIZE -0.12(-2.36)b -0.12(-2.38)b -0.12(-2.33)b -0.12(-2.3)b
LN (AOUTPUT) -0.14(-5.69)a -0.14(-5.76)a -0.13(-5.42)a -0.13(-5.4)a
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.66) 0.00(0.72) 0.00(1.23) 0.00(1.22)
1980s 0.35(5.39)a 0.34(5.36)a 0.43(6.44)a 0.43(6.45)a
Constant -0.76 (-10.74)a 1.21 (3.82)a 1.23 (3.88)a 0.16 (0.42) 0.17 (0.45)
N 8,164 8,164 8,164 8,026 8,026
Pseudo-R2 0.033 0.04 0.04 0.045 0.046
a =s i g n i ﬁcant at 1%, b =s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%, c =s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%
36Table 5 reports estimates of multinomial logit models with diﬀerent sets of explanatory variables. The
unit of observation is a plant acquired in a merger. We report estimates for the decision to sell (Panel A)
or close (Panel A) a plant relative to the baseline decision to keep a plant by year +3 where the acquisition
is completed in year 0. RELATED is 1 if a target’s main business overlaps with an acquirer main division
and zero otherwise. TMAIN equals 1 if the plant’s output is at least 25% of the aggregate output of
all plants owned by the target and zero otherwise. TBEME is the target’s book-to-market ratio decile.
AMARG and TMARG denote the acquirer and target’s operating margins minus the median margin of all
plants in the 3-digit SIC, respectively. ASKILL denotes the average 3-digit SIC industry-adjusted margin
of all the plants owned by the acquirer outside its main divisions. IND R&D denotes the aggregate R
& D expenditure by all ﬁrms in the 3-digit SIC code to which the plant belongs. INDRET is the (t,
t+2) buy-and-hold return for the Fama-French 48-industry group to which the plant belongs. INDMARG
and SD(INDMARG) denote the median operating margin and the standard deviation of the operating
margin of all plants in the same 3-digit SIC code as the plant. TRELSIZE denotes the aggregate deﬂated
output of all the plants owned by the target to the aggregate output of the acquirer. LN(AOUTPUT)
denotes the natural logarithm of the aggregate deﬂated output of all plants owned by the acquirer. 1980s
is 1 if the merger was completed between 1981 and 1989 and zero otherwise. The sample consists of
mergers from the SDC Platinum database announced between 1981 and 2000 and completed within 180
days of announcement, in which the target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC
code between 2000 and 3999 and has matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database
maintained at the U.S. Department of Commerce.
37Table 6
Multinomial logit models for disposition: Marginal Eﬀects
Independent Variable Marginal Eﬀect on Sell Decision
RELATED -0.08(-6.80)a -0.13(-7.22)a -0.13(-7.17)a -0.13(-6.74)a -0.12(-6.46)a
TMAIN -0.17(-20.29)a -0.13(-13.03)a -0.13(-13.13)a -0.14(-13.46)a -0.14(-13.37)a
TBEME 0.02(2.87)a 0.01(1.91)c 0.01(1.75)c 0.02(1.9)c 0.01(1.67)c
TMARG -0.08(-4.71)a -0.10(-5.08)a -0.09(-4.89)a -0.10(-5.17)a -0.10(-5.21)a
AMARG -0.02(-0.34) -0.05(-0.91) -0.05(-0.93)
ASKILL -0.14(-2.3)b -0.15(-2.36)b 0.01(0.12)
INDRET 0.03(2.3)b 0.03(2.47)b
ASKILL* INDRET -0.55(-3.21)a
IND R&D 0.4285704(2.05)b 0.40(1.92)c
SD (INDMARG) -0.19(-1.21) -0.20(-1.22)
INDMARG 0.13(2.51)b 0.12(2.46)b
TRELSIZE 0.02(2.19)b 0.02(2.17)b 0.02(1.85)c 0.02(1.88)c
LN (AOUTPUT) 0.01(4)a 0.01(3.93)a 0.01(3.61)a 0.01(3.63)a
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.5) 0.00(0.5) 0.00(0.5) 0.00(0.44)
1980s 0.03(3.34)a 0.03(3.25)a 0.04(3.65)a 0.04(3.55)a
Independent variable Marginal Eﬀect on Close Decision
RELATED -0.03(-2.45)b -0.03(-1.68)c -0.03(-1.62) -0.02(-1.04) -0.02(-1.17)
TMAIN -0.01(-3.41)a -0.03(-3.46)a -0.03(-3.48)a -0.04(-3.69)a -0.04(-3.73)a
TBEME 0.01(2.00)b -0.01(-0.67) 0.00(-0.64) 0.00(0.38) 0.00(0.42)
TMARG -0.08(-4.61)a -0.09(-4.88)a -0.09(-4.85)a -0.08(-4.5)a -0.08(-4.48)a
AMARG 0.02(0.47) -0.01(-0.2) -0.01(-0.22)
ASKILL -0.03(-0.54) -0.04(-0.76) -0.09(-1.4)
INDRET 0.00(0.08) 0.00(0.07)
ASKILL* INDRET 0.16(1.11)
IND R&D 0.59(3.14)a 0.60(3.18)a
SD (INDMARG) 0.41(2.65)a 0.41(2.65)a
INDMARG 0.13(2.68)a 0.13(2.66)a
TRELSIZE -0.02(-2.89)a -0.02(-2.91)a -0.20(-2.78)a -0.02(-2.8)a
LN (AOUTPUT) -0.02(-6.57)a -0.02(-6.61)a -0.02(-6.21)a -0.02(-6.23)a
ANUMPLANT 0.00(0.52) 0.00(0.58) 0.00(1.08) 0.00(1.09)
1980s 0.04(4.47)a 0.04(4.45)a 0.05(5.45)a 0.05(5.48)a
38Table 6 (continued)
Multinomial logit models for disposition: Marginal Eﬀects
Independent Variable Marginal Eﬀect on Keep Decision
RELATED 0.11 (7.90)a 0.16(8.02)a 0.16(7.96)a 0.14(7)a 0.14(6.81)a
TMAIN 0.18(17.82)a 0.16(13.48)a 0.17(13.58)a 0.17(13.99)a 0.17(13.94)a
TBEME -0.03(-3.83)a -0.01(-1.00) -0.01(-0.90) -0.18(-1.83)a -0.02(-1.67)c
TMARG 0.16(7.41)a 0.18(7.87)a 0.18(7.66)a 0.18(7.56)a 0.18(7.57)a
AMARG 0.00(-0.07) 0.05(0.93) 0.06(0.95)
ASKILL 0.17(2.3)b 0.19(2.52)b 0.08(0.92)
INDRET -0.03(-1.94)c -0.03(-2.07)b
ASKILL* INDRET 0.39(2.02)b
IND R&D -1.02(-3.98)a -1.00(-3.91)a
SD (INDMARG) -0.21(-1.07) -0.21(-1.07)
INDMARG -0.25(-4.09)a -0.25(-4.03)a
TRELSIZE 0.00(0.34) 0.00(0.37) 0.00(0.49) 0.00(0.49)
LN (AOUTPUT) 0.01(1.82)c 0.01(1.92)c 0.01(1.8)c 0.01(1.8)c
ANUMPLANT 0.00(-0.82) 0.00(-0.86) 0.00(-1.25) 0.00(-1.2)
1980s -0.07(-6.28)a -0.07(-6.2)a -0.09(-7.26)a -0.09(-7.2)a
a =s i g n i ﬁcant at 1%, b =s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%, c =s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%
Table 6 reports the marginal eﬀects associated with the multinomial logit estimates reported in Table
5. The unit of observation is a plant acquired in a merger. We report estimates for the decision to sell
(Panel A) or close (Panel A) a plant relative to the baseline decision to keep a plant before year +3 where
the merger is completed in year 0.R E L A T E Di s1i fat a r g e t ’ sm a i nb u s i n e s so v e r l a p sw i t ha na c q u i r e r
division and zero otherwise. TMAIN equals 1 if the plant’s output is at least 25% of the aggregate output
of all plants owned by the target and zero otherwise. TBEME is the target’s book-to-market ratio decile.
TMARG denotes the target’s operating margin minus the median margin of all plants in its 3-digit SIC.
AMARG denotes a similar margin averaged across all plants of the acquirer. ASKILL denotes the average
3-digit SIC industry-adjusted margin of all the plants owned by the acquirer outside its main divisions.
IND R&D denotes the aggregate R & D expenditure by all ﬁrms in the 3-digit SIC code to which the
plant belongs. INDRET is the (t, t +2 ) buy-and-hold return for the Fama-French 48-industry group
to which the plant belongs. INDMARG and SD(INDMARG) denote the median operating margin and
the standard deviation of the operating margin of all plants in the same 3-digit SIC code as the plant.
TRELSIZE denotes the aggregate deﬂated output of all the plants owned by the target divided by the
aggregate output of the acquirer. LN(AOUTPUT) denotes the natural logarithm of the aggregate deﬂated
output of all plants owned by the acquirer. 1980s is 1 if the merger was completed between 1981 and 1989
and zero otherwise. The sample consists of mergers from the SDC M&A database announced between
1981 and 2000 and completed within 180 days of announcement, in which the target is a domestic U.S.
ﬁrm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and 3999 with matching input/output data
in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the U.S. Department of Commerce.
39Table 7
Changes in Performance After Acquisition
Kept Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
Statistic π−1 ∆π−1,+1 ∆π−1,+2 ∆π−1,+3 π−1 ∆π−1,+1 ∆π−1,+2 ∆π−1,+3
π = TFP 0.201 (19.70)a 0.063 (7.56)a 0.081(8.91)a 0.063 (6.61)a 0.21 (17.64)a 0.057 (5.76)a 0.094 (8.87)a 0.064 (5.31)a
6,348 6,346 6,346 6,346 4,452 4,452 4,452 4,452
π = Margin 0.032 (12.22)a 0.011 (5.34)a 0.011 (5.10)a 0.021 (9.24)a 0.036 (11.42)a 0.017 (6.75)a 0.012 (4.55)a 0.022 (7.94)a
6,409 6,409 6,409 6,409 4,452 4,452 4,452 4,452
Sold Plants
Full Sample Sample With Acquirer BE/ME
π = TFP 0.047 (3.28)a 0.013 (1.05) 0.022 (1.60) 0.027 (1.87)c 0.055 (2.85)a 0.006 (0.34) 0.016 (0.87) 0.027 (1.45)
2,871 2,871 2,871 2,871 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
π = Margin 0.002 (0.63) -0.001 (-0.37) 0.003 (0.75) 0.007 (1.95)c -0.007 (-1.38) 0.002 (0.49) -0.003 (-0.57) -0.003 (-0.54)
2,905 2,905 2,905 2,905 1,530 1,530 1,530 1,530
t-statistics from test of signiﬁcance of the average from zero in parentheses
a = signiﬁcant at 1%, b = signiﬁcant at 5%, c = signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 7 reports the average total factor productivity (TFP) and operating margin in year −1 and the changes in TFP between year
−1 and years +1, +2, and +3 for target plants acquired in mergers between 1981 and 2000 where the merger is completed in year 0.
Acquired plants are classiﬁed as kept if the acquirer retains ownership of plants as of year +3 and as sold if he plant was operating
but not owned by the acquirer as of year +3. We report statistics for two eﬃciency measures π: (1) Operating margin, which is
ratio of the operating income before depreciation to the total plant shipments minus the industry median margin; (2) TFP, which
is a plant’s log output minus the predicted output based on a long-linear production function with squared and cross-product terms
estimated for all plants in the industry. The sample consists of mergers from the SDC M&A database announced between 1981 and
2000 and completed within 180 days of announcement, in which the target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at least one reported 4-digit
SIC code between 2000 and 3999 and has matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the
U.S. Department of Commerce. We report two sets of estimates, one for all target plants and one for all target plants for which the
acquirer’s book-to-market ratio is available in COMPUSTAT.
4
0Table 8
Explaining changes in proﬁtability after acquisition: kept plants
TFP Operating Margin
TMARG -0.047 (-0.79) -0.185 (-2.32)b -0.466 (34.12)a -0.503 (26.93)a
AMARG 0.531 (4.63)a 0.715 ( 4.34)a 0.217 (8.19)a 0.271 ( 6.95)a
ASKILL 0.473 (3.37)a 0.444 ( 2.95)a 0.108 (3.32)a 0.091 ( 2.53)b
TRELSIZE -0.010 (-1.14) -0.043 (-3.41)a 0.001 (0.30) -0.004 (-1.49)
TBEME -0.041 (-1.98)b -0.052 (-1.40) -0.003 (-0.57) 0.004 ( 0.44)
1980s -0.032 (-1.29) -0.054 (-1.51) -0.012 (-1.97)b -0.005 (-0.63)
ABEME -0.074 (-1.46) -0.045 (-3.67)a
DIAGONAL -0.131 (-4.08)a -0.013 (-1.67)c
λ -0.119 (-1.64)c -0.165 (-1.72)c -0.049 (-2.86)a -0.028 (-1.21)
CONSTANT -0.011 (-0.27) -0.031 (-0.45) 0.004 (0.43) 0.015 ( 0.93)
N 4,239 2,356 4,452 2,475
F-statistic 7.67 (0.00) 9.12 (0.00) 194.91 (0.00) 94.57 (0.00)
π -C o u n t e r f a c t u a lπ 0.048 (17.30)a 0.027 (7.64)a 0.033 (11.63)a 0.03 (8.17)a
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
a =s i g n i ﬁcant at 1%, b =s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%, c =s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%
Table 8 reports regression estimates in which the dependent variable is either the change in the total
factor productivity (TFP) or the change in operating margin for a plant between year −1 and year +3
where the acquisition completion is year 0. The merger sample consists of mergers from the SDC M&A
database that are announced between 1981 and 2000, completed within 180 days of announcement and
in which the target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000
and 3999, and has matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the
U.S. Department of Commerce. The sample used in Table 9 consists of all acquired plants kept by the
acquirer at the end of year 3. TMARG denotes the target’s operating margin minus the median margin
of all plants in the target plant’s 3-digit SIC. AMARG denotes a similar margin averaged across all plants
of the acquirer, while ASKILL is the same margin averaged over all the plants owned by the acquirer
outside its main divisions. TRELSIZE is the ratio of the aggregate deﬂated output of all the plants owned
by the target to the aggregate deﬂated output of the acquirer. TBEME is the decile to which a target’s
book-to-market ratio belongs. 1980s is 1 if the merger was completed between 1981 and 1989 and zero
otherwise. ABEME is the decile to which the acquirer’s book-to-market ratio belongs. DIAGONAL is 1
if the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the acquirer and target book-to-market ratio decile is less
than 1 and zero otherwise. λ is the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model (estimates not reported to
conserve space) in which the dependent variable is 1 if a plant is sold and zero if a plant is kept and the
independent variables are as in Table 5. The variable π - Counterfactual π is the average TFP (operating
margin) of the plants that were kept, minus the predicted TFP (operating margin) if the plants had been
sold oﬀ.
41Table 9
Explaining changes in performance after acquisition: sold plants
π = TFP π = Operating Margin
TMARG -0.319 (-3.10)a -0.272 (-1.59) -0.612 (26.50)a -0.586 (15.60)a
AMARG -0.059 (-0.28) 0.127 (0.41) 0.004 ( 0.09) -0.119 (-1.65)c
ASKILL 0.276 (1.10) 0.175 (0.59) 0.099 ( 1.70)c 0.043 ( 0.62)
TRELSIZE -0.030 (-1.78)c -0.050 (-1.72)c -0.011 (-2.76)a -0.014 (-2.11)b
TBEME 0.003 (0.13) 0.135 (2.01)b -0.003 (-0.57) 0.012 ( 0.76)
1980s 0.002 (0.05) -0.102 (-1.30) 0.011 ( 1.09) -0.015 (-0.57)
ABEME 0.170 (1.45) -0.003 (-0.20)
DIAGONAL 0.150 (2.22)b 0.019 ( 1.05)
λ -0.002 (-0.02) -0.084 (-0.73) 0.022 ( 1.26) 0.004 ( 0.16)
CONSTANT -0.084 (-0.68) -0.291 (-1.41) -0.056 (-1.94)b -0.061 (-1.27)
N 1451 670 1,530 707
F-statistic 2.19 (0.03) 2.12 (0.03) 112.93 (0.00) 33.13 (0.00)
π -C o u n t e r f a c t u a lπ 0.015 (1.72)c -0.006 (-1.55) 0.0048 (1.73)c -0.012 (-1.55)
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
a =s i g n i ﬁcant at 1%, b =s i g n i ﬁcant at 5%, c =s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%
Table 9 reports regression estimates in which the dependent variable is either the change in the total
factor productivity (TFP) or the change in operating margin for a plant between year −1 and year +3
where the acquisition completion is year 0. The merger sample consists of mergers from the SDC M&A
database that are announced between 1981 and 2000, completed within 180 days of announcement and
in which the target is a domestic U.S. ﬁrm with at least one reported 4-digit SIC code between 2000 and
3999, and has matching input/output data in the Longitudinal Research Database maintained at the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The sample used in Table 9 consists of all acquired plants that were sold oﬀ
by the acquirer by the end of year 3. TMARG denotes the target’s operating margin minus the median
margin of all plants in the target plant’s 3-digit SIC. AMARG denotes a similar margin averaged across all
plants of the acquirer, while ASKILL is the same margin averaged over all the plants owned by the acquirer
outside its main divisions. TRELSIZE is the ratio of the aggregate deﬂated output of all the plants owned
by the target to the aggregate deﬂated output of the acquirer. TBEME is the decile to which a target’s
book-to-market ratio belongs. 1980s is 1 if the merger was completed between 1981 and 1989 and zero
otherwise. ABEME is the decile to which the acquirer’s book-to-market ratio belongs. DIAGONAL is 1 if
the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the acquirer and target book-to-market ratio decile is less than
1 and zero otherwise. λ is the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model (estimates not reported to conserve
space) in which the dependent variable is 1 if a plant is sold and zero if a plant is kept and the independent
variables are as in Table 5. The variable π - Counterfactual π is the average TFP (or operating margin)
of the plants that were sold, minus the predicted TFP (or operating margin) if the plants had been kept.
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